Georgia DUI Cases of Note

  

No right to an independent test if police get a warrant for blood

Tuesday, June 06, 2017

Georgia Independent Blood testHynes v. States, A17A0633, May 31, 2017  James Hynes was charged with failure to maintain lane, DUI less safe, and DUI per se. Hynes filed a motion to suppress the results of a blood test obtained pursuant to a search warrant for the failure of the Cherokee County Sheriff's Deputy to accommodate his request for an additional independent test. 

Hynes was pulled over for weaving. The Cherokee Deputy initiated a traffic stop. He smelled a heavy odor of alcohol. Hynes admitted drinking two glasses of wine. Hynes refused to participate in DUI field sobriety tests. The Deputy persisted and Hynes completed the Horizontal Gaze Nystagmus test indicating 6 of 6 clues. Hynes was arrested for DUI. The Deputy read the Georgia Implied Consent rights. Hynes stated that he would take an independent test instead of responding yes or no. The Deputy deemed that response a refusal, and sought a warrant for Hynes' blood form a Magistrate Judge. 

Hynes argued that his right to an independent test under O.C.G.A. 40-6-392(a)(3) is not contingent upon submission to a state-administered test under the Georgia Implied Consent rights. The State argued that the right to an independent test under OCGA 40-6-392(a)(3) and (4) and in the implied consent rights quoted in OCGA  40-5-67.1 required submission to a state test before the right to an independent test accrues. 

OCGA 40-6-392(a)(3)  provides,

The person tested may have a physician or a qualified technician, chemist, registered nurse, or other qualified person of his own choosing administer a chemical test or tests in addition to any administered at the direction of a law enforcement officer. The justifiable failure or inability to obtain an additional test shall not preclude the admission of evidence relating to the test or tests taken at the direction of a law enforcement officer; and...

The Court of Appeals began its analysis by citing Williams v. State, 296 Ga. 817 (2015) for the proposition that all state tests must be obtained with a warrant or with consent. Implied Consent is based on the consent exception to the 4th Amendment's warrant requirement. 

The Court of Appeals determined that the Implied Rights provide an incentive to submit to the test designated by law enforcement by offering an additional independent test. Therefore, a test obtained by warrant would not trigger the right to an additional independent test by the driver. The additional independent test provided for in the implied consent rights is not a a right but rather "a matter of grace bestowed by the Georgia Legislature." See, Padidham v. State, 291 GA. 99 (2012).  

The Court of Appeals found that a test obtained by a warrant is a test at the direction of a "judicial officer" and not a "law enforcement officer" as expressly stated in OCGA 40-6-392(a)(3). 

The Court of Appeals rejected arguments that Police would seek warrants and skip implied consent rights to eliminate the Driver's right to an additional, independent test as too time consuming. The Court reasoned that Police Officers would obviously try the Implied Consent first. Further, the Court reject the argument that a Defendant has to waive his 4th Amendment rights and consent to a state administered test to obtain an additional independent test. 

The Court of Appeals affirmed the Trial Court's denial of the motion to suppress holding that no right to an independent additional test accrues until the Drivers submits to the designated State Administered Test in the Georgia Implied Consent rights. 

There are two problems with this opinion. First, the reality of the situation is that almost universally and with very few exceptions hospitals and blood drawers are employed by private companies that require patient consent for blood to be drawn even in the presence of a warrant ordering the same.  In many counties, if you do not consent to a blood or breath test after a warrant, law enforcement officers will charge you with obstruction for willfully resisting the lawful order of a law enforcement officer.  Therefore, the Georgia Implied Consent rights providing that, "After first submitting to the required state tests, you are entitled to additional chemical tests of your blood, breath, urine, or other bodily substances at your own expense and from qualified personnel of your own choosing, " is misleading. What is the difference between submitting to a required state test under implied consent and a warrant. Also if OCGA 16-10-24 provides for obstruciton of a law enforcement officer in the lawful discharge of his duties and not a judicial officer. Failing to submit to a test with a warrant would be criminal contempt and not obstruction since a test ordered in a warrant is by a judical officer and not by a law enforcement officer. 

Secondly, the Court of Appeals cited South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U. S. 553, 560 (II) (103 SCt 916, 74 LEd2d 748) (1983) for the proposition that "the admission into evidence of a defendant's refusal to submit to [a blood-alcohol test] does not offend the right against self-incrimination."  However, the Neville Court premised its finding that evidence of a refusal is not incriminating in response to a lawful or legitimate request by law enforcement. Id at 564 (" We hold, therefore, that a refusal to take a blood-alcohol test, after a police officer has lawfully requested it, is not an act coerced by the officer, and thus is not protected by the privilege against self-incrimination.")  However, the Georgia Implied Consent rights are neither lawful or legitimate because they are false. First, Georgia law does not require you to submit to testing as the Georgia Constitutional provides protection from incriminating acts and words. As such blowing into a breath device is an incriminating act protected by the Georgia Constitution. See generally, Creamer v. State, 229 Ga. 511, 192 S.E.2d 350 (1972)Aldrich v. State, 220 Ga. 132, 137 S.E.2d 463 (1964).  Further, if you refuse your license will not necessarily be suspended for one year as expressly state in the Georgia Implied Consent rights. 

This is the nature of legal opinions. Inevitably new appellate opinions create more questions than they answer. 

-Author: George Creal




Tags

 

Archive




No legal advice should be obtained from the web site alone. George C. Creal, Jr., P.C. is Georgia Professional Corporation authorized to practice law in the State of Georgia only and all information contained in this web site is intended for use for DUI/DWIs occurring in the State of Georgia. Individuals with DUI/DWIs from outside the State of Georgia should contact a licensed attorney in the state of occurrence of their DUI. Copyright © 2015 George C. Creal, Jr. P.C.
Protected by Copyscape Online Plagiarism Checker
George C. Creal Jr.
on Google+






Atlanta Office: 480 John Wesley Dobbs Ave., NE, Unit 190, Atlanta, GA 30312 Phone: (404) 333-0706