In Wright v. State, the Georgia Court of Appeals held that a roadblock was constitutional if it was initiated by a Sergeant supervising all Troopers at a particular Post and he used a Roadblock Approval Form. The Sergeant testified that under an unintroduced Georgia State Patrol Policy he has the authority to authorize roadblocks. In Georgia a police roadblock is constitutional provided that, among other things, the decision to implement the roadblock was supervisory personnel rather than officers in the field. Moreover, the Court reasoned that the supervisory officer must have a valid primary purpose for the roadblock other than merely seeking to uncover evidence of wrongdoing. In establishing the lawfulness of the a roadblock, the state has the burden of presenting some admissible evidence, testimonial or written, that the supervisory officers decided to implement the roadblock, decided when to implement it, and had a legitimate primary purpose for it.

This a bad decision because it ignores the requirement that the supervisor be a programmic level supervisor and not a supervisor in the field. A roadblock is valid when the decision to implement the checkpoint was made at programmatic level with for an appropriate purpose by supervisory officers and not officers in the field, and the supervisor had a legitimate primary purpose.

A police roadblock is constitutional provided that, among other things, the decision to implement the roadblock was made by supervisory personnel rather than officers in the field. Blackburn v. State, 256 Ga. App. 800; 570 S.E.2d 36 (2002).

Moreover, the supervisory officers must have a valid primary purpose for the roadblock other than merely seeking to uncover evidence of ordinary criminal wrongdoing. Id. In establishing the lawfulness of a roadblock, the state has the burden of presenting some admissible evidence, testimonial or written, that supervisory officers decided to implement the roadblock, decided when and where to implement it, and had a legitimate primary purpose for it. Id. A Standard Operating Procedure can be evidence of authority to implement a roadblock but if it is relied upon it must be followed otherwise the roadblock must be authorized independently of the Standard Operating Procedure. In Harwood v. State, 262 Ga. App. 818, 821 (2003), the Court did not require that the roadblock comply with the standard operating procedures requiring cones and flashlights only because Sgt. Tammaro’s authority for the roadblock was based upon verbal authority from his supervisor and was not dependent on the standard operating procedure and was therefore not a constitutional minimum requirement of programmatic level supervisor authority. In Dymond v. State, 248 Ga. App. 582, 584(2001), the Court was dealing with an employee handbook and not a standard operating procedure. The Dymond Court found that the witness testified that “the handbook at issue as an employee manual and testified that it did not set forth “our standard operating procedure.” The Dymond Court found that no testimony showed otherwise. Finally,although State v. Sherrill, 247 Ga. App. 708, 712 (2001) found Standard Operating Procedures not required to be followed, it has been expressly overruled and the Standard Operating Procedure was not cited as the basis for the officer’s authority to implement the roadblock.

A roadblock must be conducted pursuant to a plan devised by supervisory personnel and not by officers in the field using their unfettered discretion. Baker v. State, 252 Ga. App. 695 (2001).

A supervisor has been defined as in Ross v. State, 257 Ga. App. 541(2002), as a Lieutenant in the field at the time the roadblocks in issue were established, not as a field officer participating in the roadblocks, but as the supervisor on the scene; and that he supervised the Traffic Unit of the Clayton County Police Department as its officer-in-charge, supervising six full-time traffic officers and, on a part-time basis, five officers assigned to the DUI task force; and Chief of Police policy authorized him to order roadblocks as a supervisor; and he ordered the roadblocks, determining where and when they would occur; and that the officers who executed the roadblocks had not participated in the decision to do so; and that the roadblocks were set up to check drivers for sobriety and operator’s permits.

In Harwood v. State, 262 Ga. App. 818 (2003), the Court of Appeals found that Sargent Tammaro who implemented the roadblock was an supervisor at the programmatic level as he was, as a sargent, the supervisor of the department’s traffic enforcement unit; and that his authority to implement roadblocks came from the department’s policy manual and from his supervisor, who had delegated the task to him; and he did not participate in the roadblock.

Permissible primary purposes are those which serve “special needs, beyond the normal need[s of] law enforcement,” and include elimination of immediate, vehicle-bound threats to life and limb, e.g., sobriety checkpoints and driver’s license examination, special circumstances such as border patrol checks near borders, and emergencies such as “an appropriately tailored roadblock set up to thwart an imminent terrorist attack or to catch a dangerous criminal who is likely to flee by way of a particular route.” Baker v. State, 252 Ga. App. 695 (2001).

The purpose in the minds of the officers in the field, as evidenced by their testimony or their actual conduct at the roadblock, is not conclusive on the threshold issue of the supervisor’s purpose. Id. Neither “collective knowledge” of the field officers nor the actions of the officers on the scene are competent evidence of purpose at the “programmatic level.” Id. At 702.
The phrase “decision to implement” includes deciding to have this roadblock, and where and when to have it. Baker v. State, 252 Ga. App. 695, 702 (1) (556 S.E.2d 892) (2001).

The Baker Court overruled the following decisions: State v. Sherrill, 247 Ga. App. 708, 710 (2) (545 S.E.2d 110) (2001) (witness had “no personal knowledge of the supervising officer who actually authorized the roadblock, and the State was unable to come forward with this information at the hearing”); Boyce v. State, 240 Ga. App. 388 (523 S.E.2d 607) (1999) (field officer decided); Albert v. State, 236 Ga. App. 146. 147 (1) (511 S.E.2d 244) (1999) (although roadblock was established “pursuant to departmental policy,” decision to implement this roadblock made by field officers); Payne v. State, 232 Ga. App. 591 (502 S.E.2d 526) (1998) (witness did not know which supervisor made decision; no evidence of supervisor’s primary purpose); Heimlich v. State, 231 Ga. App. 662, 500 S.E.2d 388 (1998)(supervisor issued “standing order” permitting; field officers decided time and place); Mims v. State, 201 Ga. App. 277 (410 S.E.2d 824) (1991); and Evans v. State, 190 Ga. App. 856 (380 S.E.2d 332) (1989).

In Heimlich v. State, 231 Ga. App. 662 (1998), which was expressly overruled by Baker, is most analogous to the Wright Court’s position that supervisors may delegate authority to field officers as to when and where to hold road blocks. Field Sargents simply are not programmatic level supervisors unless they are supervising a Departmental Unit. A Post is essentially a field office. A Field Officer is not equivalent to a Departmental Unit.

Further the State must prove that all vehicles were stopped as opposed to random stops; the delay to motorists was minimal; the roadblock operation was well-identified as a police checkpoint; and the screening officer’s training and experience were sufficient to qualify him to make an initial determination as to which motorists should be given field sobriety tests for intoxication. Thomas v. State, 277 Ga. App. 88; 625 S.E.2d 455 (2005). These factors are not general guidelines, but are minimum constitutional prerequisites. See Thomas, supra.

The real problem with this decision is that it further erodes the forethought requirement for a Constitutional roadblock as foreseen by the U.S. Supreme Court. What is happening is that field supervisors are deciding at roll call on the night of a roadblock to have a road block. Half the time there is not the forethought that this or that area or time is particularly prone to DUIs. They don’t even go back to the Office to get Roadblock signs and cones. There is no plan no purpose. Just a boilerplate form filled out at the end of the roadblock and submitted to supervisors the next day. It is a spur of the moment decision which is exactly what the U.S. Supreme Court was trying to protect against.

Query: If the Sergeant was a programmic level supervisor why did he have to fill out a Road Block Approval Form?

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