On July 24, 2005, Lieutenant Mike Matics of the City of Decatur (Georgia) Police Department decided to implement a roadblock.  The roadblock was part of the “Hundred Days of Summer Heat” statewide anti-dui campaign.  The Lieutenant had participated in Atlanta-Metropolitan wide meetings on the campaign and was familiar with the policy behind the campaign.  At roll call that evening, the Lieutenant told his officers that if they had enough man-power, they would have a roadblock in a specific area based on his knowledge of two DUI fatalities in a specific area.  The roadblock was “appropriately mark” (this typically would mean roadblock ahead signs, emergency cones, flashlights with orange cones, reflective police vests, and/or  police cars with activated emergency lights on both sides of the road) and all cars were stopped.

In Georgia for a roadblock to be valid, the evidence must show that (1) a supervisor rather than field officers decided to implement the roadblock; (2) all vehicles were stopped: (3) any delay to motorists was minimal; (4) the roadblock is well identified as a police check point; and (5) the screening officer’s training and experience are sufficient to qualify him to make an initial determination as to which motorists should be given field tests for intoxication.  Baker v. State, 252 Ga. App. 695, 696 (1) (556 SE2d 892) (2001).   Additionally the primary purpose of the roadblock must be legitimate. Id.

Bennett argued that there was no competent evidence of a primary purpose of the roadblock.  He contended that the only competent evidence with inadmissible hearsay regarding the “Hundred days of Summer Heat.”  He also contended that Lt. Matics discussing the “Hundred days of Summer Heat with supervisor was hearsay.  The Court reasoned that the fact that the policy behind the roadblock did not “mitigate” the Lieutenant’s authority to implement a roadblock for potential seatbelt and DUI infractions both of which it held are permissible purposes for a roadblock.

The Court rejected Bennett’s contention that the roadblock was a roving patrol as the decision to have a roadblock was made at the spur of the moment by a shift supervisor citing Thomas v. State, 277 Ga. App. 88 (625 SE2d 455) (2005).  The Court distinguished the Thomas case, supra, reasoning that in Thomas the decision to implement the roadblock was made in the middle of the shift in the middle of a parking lot [instead of at the beginning of the shift in the roll call room?] and there was a lack of evidence that the officer had authority to implement a roadblock.   The Court found that based on the record this was not a spur of the moment decision and the Lieutenant had authority to implement the roadblock. [the court cites no evidence from the record of this other than the note the Lieutenant testified that police department policy was followed in the implementation of the roadblock but nothing is indicated that the departmental policy granted authority to the Lieutenant to order the roadblock? Reasoning that deciding to have a roadblock at the beginning of a shift as opposed to the middle is disingenuous]
The motion to suppress the stop was denied.

Editorial: One element is noticeably absent in the Court’s decision and that is that the roadblock must be implement by a “programmic level supervisor” for legitimate primary purpose at a particular location, at a particular time for a particular purpose.  How can a shift supervisor be a programmic level supervisor.  There is no evidence of a grant of authority from the chief or other supervisor for this particular roadblock.  Blanket grants of authority are frequently upheld but not in keeping with the idea of  a “programmic level supervisor” deciding to have a roadblock for legitimate primary purpose at a particular location, at a particular time for a particular purpose.   We do not even know  what the departmental  standard  operating procedure says or  whether is  binding on the officer  with  regard to any delegation of authority from supervisors.    The  real problem is that  Supreme Court jurisprudence  requires  forethought and planning.   Deciding to have a roadblock  on the night of the roadblock without  talking to supervisors because  you  went to a conference  a month ago  is  not enough.   There should be a  discussion with supervisors regarding an  identifiable  problem at a  particular time of  night  at  a specific  location, a decision to commit resources  to the area,  perhaps  an assignment of  Officers from other shifts to participate in the roadblock.   Signs, Cones and Flashlights are not required by the Constitution for  roadblocks  but forethought  is  and having to  go back to the  office or  bring special equipment in the field  is  evidence of that forethought.   In conclusion ,  spur of the moment roadblocks are a  threat to our  constitutional  rights.


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