As a Georgia DUI and constitutional lawyer, I often navigate cases where government actions—whether from executive agencies, the legislature, or the judiciary—test the boundaries of individual rights, due process, and separation of powers. The Georgia Supreme Court's recent decision in Republican National Committee et al. v. Eternal Vigilance Action, Inc. et al. (917 S.E.2d 125, decided June 10, 2025) is a landmark ruling on these fronts. While focused on election rules, it tightens the nondelegation doctrine, overrules a flawed precedent, and could have far-reaching implications for statutes like OCGA § 38-3-62, which grants the judiciary broad powers to declare "judicial emergencies" and suspend deadlines (e.g., statutes of limitations in criminal cases). This is especially relevant in DUI defense, where emergency tolling during events like COVID-19 extended prosecution windows. Let's break down the case, then compare/contrast it with OCGA § 38-3-62 and explore the potential impact.

Case Background: SEB's Election Rules Challenged

In 2024, the State Elections Board (SEB), an executive agency, rolled out seven new rules ahead of the November election, ostensibly to promote fair elections. These included:
1. Requiring county boards to conduct a "reasonable inquiry" before certifying results.
2. Allowing board members to examine all election-related documents pre-certification.
3. Mandating hand-counts of ballots at precincts after polls close.
4. Daily reporting of vote totals on a public website.
5. Expanding poll watcher access to tabulation areas.
6. Requiring photo ID for family/caregivers dropping off absentee ballots.                                                                                                                       7. Mandating video surveillance of drop boxes outside voting hours.

Plaintiffs—a nonprofit (Eternal Vigilance Action, Inc.) and two voters (Scot Turner and James Hall)—sued, claiming the rules violated the nondelegation doctrine (by letting the SEB "legislate" without sufficient guidelines) and conflicted with the Election Code. Intervenors like the Georgia NAACP challenged specifics (e.g., hand-counts), while the RNC defended. The trial court enjoined the rules as unconstitutional. On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.

Standing: A Stricter Gatekeeper for Challenges

Standing—who can sue—is always the first hurdle in constitutional cases. The court reiterated Georgia's "bedrock" rule: Plaintiffs must assert violation of their own private rights.

• Organizations Rejected: No "diversion of resources" standing (just factual harm isn't enough), and associational standing (suing for members) was overruled as incompatible with Georgia law, axing Aldridge v. Ga. Hosp. & Travel Assn. (1983).
• Community Stakeholder Standing Limited: This applies to local governments, not state agencies like the SEB.
• Voter Standing Granted for Five Rules: Turner and Hall had standing as voters for rules threatening their right to vote (e.g., risking ballot rejection via ID requirements or non-certification). But not for poll watchers or daily reporting, as those don't affect casting/counting votes.
• Remand on Board Member Standing: Hall, a Chatham County election board member, claimed personal risk (e.g., liability for following conflicting rules). Remanded for proper analysis.
  This reinforces that in DUI cases, defendants must show personal rights violations (e.g., due process in breath tests) to challenge rules—no piggybacking on others' harms.

Merits: Reviving the Nondelegation Doctrine and Overruling DOT

The court clarified nondelegation (rooted in separation of powers): The legislature can't hand off lawmaking without objective, enforceable guidelines. A three-step test: (1) Actual delegation? (2) Legislature's power to delegate? (3) Permissible (with guidelines)?

• Overruling DOT:The court buried Dept. of Transp. v. City of Atlanta (1990), which allowed vague "reasonable/necessary/public interest" standards for eminent domain delegation. It was an "outlier," unsound, and stare decisis didn't save it—not ancient, not entrenched, no major reliance.
• Rule Outcomes: Four rules invalid as unauthorized (inconsistent with statutes, no delegation). One (drop box surveillance) upheld as gap-filling with guidelines. Two remanded.

Declaratory relief was proper for voters facing uncertainty, and a federal Elections Clause claim was rejected.

Comparing and Contrasting with OCGA § 38-3-62: Judicial Emergency Powers Under Scrutiny

Now, let's tie this to OCGA § 38-3-62, part of Georgia's Emergency Management Act. This statute authorizes "authorized judicial officials" (e.g., the Chief Justice) to declare judicial emergencies and suspend/toll deadlines in civil/criminal cases, including:

• Statutes of limitation.
• Speedy trial demands.
• Indictment/accusation timelines.
• Habeas corpus filings.

Subsection (a) grants broad relief "as determined to be necessary," while (b) adds structure for speedy trials (certifications based on caseload/backlog factors, 8-month max, trial plans, Chief Justice oversight—but expired June 30, 2023, per (b)(13); assume extensions or similar provisions persist for analysis).

Similarities to the Election Case:

• Delegation Concerns: Both involve delegating legislative-like power (suspending laws in § 38-3-62; rulemaking in SEB case) without clear limits. The election case struck rules for exceeding statutes or lacking guidelines; similarly, § 38-3-62(a)'s "as necessary" is amorphous, potentially allowing indefinite suspensions (e.g., tolling DUI misdemeanor SOL from 2 years, as during COVID).
• Inter-Branch Issues: Nondelegation typically hits executive delegations, but the principle applies to judiciary too (per historical cases cited). Both risk one branch "legislating" (judiciary nullifying statutes vs. SEB creating new requirements).
• Due Process Overlap: The argument against § 38-3-62 (no review of emergency declarations, unlimited scope/time) mirrors the election case's emphasis on enforceable guidelines to prevent arbitrary power.

Contrasts:

• Branch Involved: SEB case was executive overreach; § 38-3-62 delegates to judiciary, which might get more deference as a "core judicial function" (managing courts). But the court in Perdue v. Baker (2003, cited in the argument) stressed flexibility in separation but warned against encroachments—judiciary suspending SOL could be seen as executive/legislative turf.
• Guidelines Present?: SEB statutes were narrowed to require "consistency with law"; § 38-3-62(a) lacks specific factors, but (b) has detailed certifications (e.g., caseload stats, plans)—more like the upheld drop box rule. However, (a)'s breadth resembles invalidated SEB rules.
• Emergency Context: § 38-3-62 is tied to crises (e.g., pandemics), with implicit limits (must relate to judicial ops), unlike SEB's peacetime rules. But the argument notes no termination mechanism like gubernatorial emergencies (OCGA § 38-3-51).

Potential Impact of the New Precedent on OCGA § 38-3-62

This ruling's stricter nondelegation (overruling DOT's lax standards) could doom parts of § 38-3-62, especially (a). Courts must now ensure delegations have "objective, judicially enforceable guidelines"—vague "as necessary" might fail, inviting challenges like the provided argument (unconstitutional delegation, no review, ultra vires).

• In Criminal/DUI Cases: During COVID, judicial emergencies tolled SOL, extending DUI prosecutions (misdemeanors: normally 2 years). Post-2025, defendants could argue tolling was invalid, seeking dismissals. If § 38-3-62 lacks guidelines, emergencies might be limited to structured ones (like (b)), shortening extensions.
• Broader Effects: Reinforces separation—judiciary can't "enact tyrannical laws" that combine judicial and legislative power. Could curb future emergency overreach, protecting due process. But if upheld, (b)'s factors provide a model for "sufficient guidelines."
• My Take as a DUI Lawyer: This empowers challenges to extended SOL in emergencies. If your DUI charge lingered due to tolling, this precedent could be key to dismissal. It also bolsters arguments against agency rules in licensing suspensions or implied consent.
• Checks and Balances prevent tyranny: As the Michigan Supreme Court wrote in Midwest Institute of Health, PLLC v. Governor, Docket No. 1614492, (October 2, 2020), “[T]he principal function of the separation of powers . . . is to . . . protect individual liberty[.]” Clinton v City of New York, 524 US 417, 482; 118 S Ct 2091; 141 L Ed 2d 393 (1998) (Breyer, J., dissenting). “ ‘[T]he accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the same hands, whether of one, a few, or many, and whether hereditary, encroaching upon the powers of another branch or by relinquishing its own powers to another branch. self-appointed, or elective, may justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny.’ ” 46th Circuit Trial Court v Crawford Co, 476 Mich 131, 141; 719 NW2d 553 (2006), quoting The Federalist No. 47 (Madison) (Rossiter ed, 1961), p 301 [emphasis added]. And as Montesquieu explained, “[w]hen the legislative and executive powers are united in the same person, or in the same body of magistrates, there can be no liberty; because apprehensions may arise, lest the same monarch or senate should enact tyrannical laws, to execute them in a tyrannical manner.” Baron de Montesquieu, The Spirit of the Laws (London: J. Nourse and P. Vaillant, 1758), Book XI, ch 6, p 216. The legislature has the power to make laws and not to make legislators.

Georgia law just got a constitutional tune-up—agencies and branches can't freelance. If facing similar issues, reach out to George Creal Law for expert defense.
Note: This is a summary; consult the full opinion and statutes for details.

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