Driving under the influence (DUI) cases in Georgia often involve complex legal issues, particularly when it comes to the Fourth Amendment’s protections against unreasonable searches and seizures. One critical aspect of DUI cases is the use of blood tests to determine the presence of alcohol or drugs in a suspect’s system. However, a recent string of Georgia Court of Appeals decisions has shed light on an important question: Does a search warrant authorizing the drawing of blood for a DUI investigation implicitly include the right to test that blood for alcohol? In this blog post, we’ll explore the Fourth Amendment’s particularity requirement in the context of Georgia DUI blood warrants and what it means for defendants.
The Fourth Amendment’s Particularity Requirement
The Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution mandates that search warrants be supported by probable cause and “particularly describ[e] the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.” United States v. Blakeney, 949 F.3d 851, 861 (4th Cir. 2020)(Finding the application for the blood-draw warrant and the warrant itself make clear that what was sought and what the magistrate judge authorized was the drawing and testing of Blakeney's blood to determine its alcohol content). This particularity requirement was designed to prevent the use of “general warrants,” which historically allowed the English to conduct broad, exploratory searches without clear limits upon American colonists—a practice the Founding Fathers abhorred and sought to eliminate.
Colonial Grievances and General Warrants
In the 17th and 18th centuries, English authorities used general warrants and writs of assistance to conduct broad, exploratory searches without specific justification or limitations. General warrants authorized officials to search for vaguely defined contraband or evidence of crime without specifying the location or items to be seized. Writs of assistance, particularly notorious in the American colonies, were even broader, granting customs officials open-ended authority to search homes, warehouses, and ships for smuggled goods, often without judicial oversight or expiration.
These practices were deeply resented in the colonies. A pivotal case in 1761, Paxton's Case in Massachusetts, involved colonial merchants challenging the renewal of writs of assistance. Lawyer James Otis Jr. argued that such writs violated fundamental rights, calling them "the worst instrument of arbitrary power" because they enabled indiscriminate searches. Otis gave the speech of his life, making references to liberty, English common law, "a man's house is his castle," and the colonists's "rights as Englishmen. Though the court upheld the writs, Otis's arguments galvanized colonial opposition and influenced revolutionary sentiment, emphasizing the need for protections against arbitrary intrusions.
English Legal Precedents
The particularity requirement also drew from English legal developments. In the 1760s, cases like Wilkes v. Wood (1763) and Entick v. Carrington (1765) addressed abuses of general warrants in England. In Wilkes, authorities used a general warrant to search the home of journalist John Wilkes for seditious papers, seizing a broad array of documents. The court ruled the warrant invalid for its lack of specificity, establishing that searches must be narrowly tailored. Similarly, in Entick, the court condemned a general warrant used to search for unspecified evidence, declaring it illegal and reinforcing the principle that government searches required clear justification and limits. These cases were widely known in the colonies and shaped the Framers' views on search and seizure.
The Fourth Amendment's Adoption
The abuses of general warrants and writs of assistance were fresh in the minds of the Founding Fathers during the drafting of the U.S. Constitution and the Bill of Rights. The Fourth Amendment, ratified in 1791, was crafted to prevent such practices:
"The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized."
The particularity clause ("particularly describing") was a direct rebuke of general warrants. It required warrants to specify the scope of the search, ensuring that government officials could not engage in fishing expeditions or harass individuals without clear justification. This reflected the Framers' broader commitment to limiting government power, as seen in debates during the Constitutional Convention and state ratification processes, where figures like Patrick Henry and Samuel Adams emphasized protections against arbitrary searches.
Early Judicial Interpretation
In the early years of the Republic, courts began enforcing the particularity requirement, though cases were sparse. One early example, Ex parte Burford (1806), involved a warrant that failed to specify the crime alleged supported by an oath. The Supreme Court invalidated the warrant, affirming that vague or overly broad warrants violated the Fourth Amendment. This set a precedent for requiring specificity in warrants, aligning with the Framers' intent to prevent exploratory searches.
Evolution in the 19th and 20th Centuries
Throughout the 19th century, the particularity requirement remained a cornerstone of Fourth Amendment law, though its application was limited by the lack of a robust exclusionary rule (evidence obtained unlawfully was often still admissible). Courts consistently struck down warrants that were overly broad, such as those authorizing searches for "all papers" without specifying their relevance to a crime.
In the 20th century, the particularity requirement gained greater significance with the development of the exclusionary rule in cases like Weeks v. United States (1914) and Mapp v. Ohio (1961), which made illegally obtained evidence inadmissible in federal and state courts, respectively. Landmark cases further clarified the requirement:
- Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States (1931): The Supreme Court invalidated a warrantless search, emphasizing that the Fourth Amendment protects against "rummaging" searches.
- Stanford v. Texas (1965): The Court struck down a warrant authorizing the seizure of "books, records, and other materials" related to communism, ruling that it was impermissibly broad and reminiscent of colonial-era general warrants.
Modern Applications
Today, the particularity requirement remains a critical safeguard against overreach, adapting to new technologies and contexts. Courts have applied it to digital searches, requiring warrants to specify the types of data or devices to be searched (e.g.,Groh v. Ramirez, 540 US 551(2004)(warrant must particularly describe the things to be seized and places to be searched) .
In the context of DUI cases, the particularity requirement applies to warrants authorizing blood draws, which are considered searches under the Fourth Amendment due to their intrusion into the body. Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S. 141, 143 (2013). For a blood warrant to be valid, it must specify not only the act of drawing the blood but also the scope of any testing to be performed, as the chemical analysis of blood constitutes a further invasion of privacy. Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 616 (1989).
Georgia Case Law: State v. de la Paz and State v. Johnson
Two recent Georgia Court of Appeals cases, State v. de la Paz, 370 Ga. App. 853, 899 S.E.2d 447 (2024), and State v. Johnson, A24A1559 (Ga. Ct. App. Jan. 28, 2025), provide critical guidance on whether a warrant to obtain blood in a DUI case implicitly authorizes testing for alcohol.
In State v. de la Paz, the defendant was arrested for DUI based on signs of alcohol impairment, such as the smell of alcohol and bloodshot eyes. The officer obtained a warrant to draw the defendant’s blood, specifically requesting that the samples be placed in a “GBI blood alcohol toxicology kit” to test for evidence of driving under the influence of alcohol under OCGA § 40-6-391(a)(1). The warrant and supporting affidavit made no mention of testing for drugs. However, after the blood tested negative for alcohol, it was retested for drugs without a new warrant, revealing the presence of a muscle relaxer. The trial court suppressed the drug test results, and the Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the warrant was limited to testing for alcohol because it specifically referenced alcohol testing and lacked any indication of authorization to test for other substances. The court emphasized that “the warrant shall particularly describe the things to be seized and the search must be limited to that matter described.” de la Paz, 370 Ga. App. at 856. In dicta, the De La Paz Court held that the warrant implicitly included the testing of the blood and a second warrant for testing was not required because the alcohol testing was “expressly contemplated” even though the warrant did not expressly state that testing was authorized only placed in a GBI evidence kit.
Similarly, in State v. Johnson, the defendant was charged with vehicular homicide and DUI after a fatal crash. The officer observed signs of alcohol consumption, and the warrant authorized a blood draw “for the purpose of testing to determine the [extent] to which Ms. Johnson had consumed alcohol.” The affidavit and warrant explicitly referenced suspicion of DUI-alcohol under OCGA § 40-6-391(a)(1) and made no mention of drugs. Despite this, the blood was tested for marijuana, and the results were challenged. Citing de la Paz, the trial court suppressed the drug test results, and the Court of Appeals affirmed, finding that the warrant’s language clearly limited testing to alcohol. The court rejected the State’s argument that the additional charge of vehicular homicide expanded the warrant’s scope, noting that the particularity requirement hinges on the warrant’s specific language, not the nature of the charges.
Does a Blood Draw Warrant Implicitly Include Alcohol Testing?
The de la Paz and Johnson decisions clarify that a warrant authorizing a blood draw in a Georgia DUI case does not implicitly include the right to test for drugs in unless the warrant explicitly authorizes such testing. The Georgia Court of Appeals has taken a strict approach to the particularity requirement in the context of GBI policy for testing blood for drugs after blood alcohol results are negative, requiring that the warrant and supporting documents (e.g., affidavit and application) clearly describe the scope of the testing to be performed. If the warrant specifies testing for alcohol—as was the case in both de la Paz and Johnson—then testing is limited to alcohol, and any testing for other substances (e.g., drugs) exceeds the warrant’s scope and violates the Fourth Amendment.
This strict interpretation stems from the principle that the chemical analysis of blood is a separate invasion of privacy that must be independently justified and authorized. As the U.S. Supreme Court noted in Skinner, “the ensuing chemical analysis of the [blood] sample to obtain physiological data is a further invasion of ... privacy interests.” 489 U.S. at 616. In Georgia, a warrant that authorizes only the drawing of blood without specifying the purpose of testing (e.g., for alcohol) would likely be deemed insufficiently particular, potentially rendering any subsequent testing invalid.
Implications for DUI Defendants in Georgia
For individuals facing DUI charges in Georgia, the de la Paz and Johnson rulings offer important protections. If your blood was drawn pursuant to a warrant, your attorney should closely examine the warrant’s language and supporting documents to ensure that any testing performed was explicitly authorized. If the warrant only mentioned alcohol but your blood was tested for drugs, the results of the drug test may be suppressed, as seen in both cases. This could significantly weaken the prosecution’s case, especially if the drug test results are central to the charges.
Moreover, these cases underscore the importance of challenging the scope of the warrant early in the legal process. A skilled DUI attorney can file a motion to suppress evidence obtained from unauthorized testing, arguing that it violates the Fourth Amendment’s particularity requirement. Even if the blood draw itself was lawful, any testing beyond the warrant’s scope is subject to suppression, potentially leading to reduced charges or dismissal.
Federal Perspective: United States v. Ray
While de la Paz and Johnson govern Georgia state courts, a recent federal case, United States v. Ray, No. 24-4024 (4th Cir. June 3, 2025), provides additional context for why a second warrant for testing must be obtained or the first warrant should expressly state testing of the blood is authorized. In Ray, a military warrant authorized the seizure of the defendant’s cell phone but did not explicitly permit a search of its contents. Despite this, investigators searched the phone and found evidence of child sexual abuse material. The Fourth Circuit affirmed the suppression of the evidence, holding that the warrant’s failure to authorize the search violated the Fourth Amendment’s particularity requirement. Critically, the court rejected the government’s argument that the “good faith exception” applied, reasoning that the warrant was unambiguous and the investigators’ actions clearly exceeded its scope. Ray reinforces that law enforcement must adhere strictly to a warrant’s terms, a principle that aligns with Georgia’s approach in DUI blood warrant cases.
Practical Advice for DUI Defendants
If you’ve been charged with a DUI in Georgia and a blood test was conducted, here are some steps to protect your rights:
- Hire an Experienced DUI Attorney: An attorney familiar with Georgia’s DUI laws and Fourth Amendment protections can review the warrant and challenge any unauthorized testing.
- Request the Warrant and Supporting Documents: Obtain copies of the warrant, affidavit, and application to determine whether the testing was properly authorized.
- File a Motion to Suppress: If the blood test exceeded the warrant’s scope (e.g., testing for drugs when only alcohol was authorized), your attorney can move to suppress the results.
- Understand Your Rights: The Fourth Amendment protects you from unreasonable searches, and Georgia courts have shown a willingness to enforce the particularity requirement strictly.
In Georgia, a warrant authorizing a blood draw in a DUI case does not implicitly include the right to test the blood for alcohol unless the warrant explicitly states so. The Georgia Court of Appeals’ decisions in State v. de la Paz and State v. Johnson make clear that the Fourth Amendment’s particularity requirement demands specificity in describing the scope of testing. For DUI defendants, this means that any blood test results obtained beyond the warrant’s authorization may be suppressed, offering a powerful defense strategy. If you’re facing a DUI charge involving a blood test, contact an experienced Atlanta DUI lawyer like George Creal to evaluate your case and protect your constitutional rights.
For a free consultation, contact George Creal at 404-333-0706] or visit www.georgecreal.com. Stay informed, and let us fight for your rights.
Disclaimer
This blog post is for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. Every DUI case is unique, and outcomes depend on specific facts and circumstances. Consult a qualified attorney for personalized legal guidance.